Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights by Barbour, Emily
Boston College Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 5
1-1-2009
Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education
Programs and Our Educational Rights
Emily Barbour
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Education Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Emily Barbour, Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights, 50
B.C.L. Rev. 197 (2009), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol50/iss1/5
SEPARATE AND INVISIBLE: ALTERNATIVE
EDUCATION PROGRAMS AND OUR
. EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
Abstract: This Note argues that many disciplinary alternative education
programs ("AEPs") violate both parents' fundamental right to control
their child's education and students' as yet unrecognized fundamental
right to receive a minimally adequate education. These programs infringe
parents' fundamental right to guide their child's upbringing by removing
both the child and the child's school from standards-based assessments,
which confounds parents' ability to compare their child's education with
their own values and to take action on the basis of that comparison. In
addition, this Note argues that the right to receive a minimally adequate
education is a longstanding tradition in America that has become increas-
ingly essential to our ordered liberty along with the expansion of suffrage
over the last century. AEPs often violate this right because they are un-
aligned with state education standards and do not offer an opportunity to
earn a diploma. As part of its conclusions, this Note identifies solutions
that, unlike the current model of AEPs, are narrowly tailored to achieve
the state's compelling interests in school discipline and in combating stu-
dents' disengagement from school.
INTRODUCTION
Timothy Nevares was an A and B student at San Marcos High
School) He liked school and had set his sights on college. 2 One day;
while Timothy was walking with friends, a young man attempted to
run Timothy over with his car. 3 The group fled and tried to defend
themselves against their assaulter by throwing gravel at the car.4 The
driver then went to the police, claiming that Timothy and his friends
had thrown rocks at his car and injured his girlfriend. 5 The police de-
tained Timothy for aggravated assault. 6 Pursuant to a Texas law, the
police alerted Timothy's high school principal that they had tempo-
Brief of Appellee at 6, Nevares v. San Marcos Canso!. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111  F.3d 25





Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 6.
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rarily detained Timothy.? Nearly two weeks after the incident, the
school pulled Timothy out of class to confirm whether the police had
detained hitn. 8 The principal announced she was transferring Timo-
thy to "Rebound," an Alternative Education Program ("AEP"). 9
Although operated by the same school district as San Marcos High,
Rebound did not offer the number of credits Timothy needed to ad-
vance to the eleventh grade.° In addition, the quality of instruction
dropped: students taught themselves out of textbooks at Rebound."
The only course taught in lecture format was the mandatory self disci-
pline class, for which the students received no credit.° The curriculum
was not based on the curriculum offered at San Marcos, and students
could not visit their old teachers there to try to keep up with the regu-
lar education coursework.° Instead, at Rebound, students sometimes
had to wait with their hands up for more than twenty-minutes before a
teacher would answer their questions. 14 Additionally; students could not
take home textbooks or school material overnight. 15
Most students at Rebound had criminal charges, predominantly
weapon and drug violations, pending against them. 16 Given the nature
of the student body; students could not go to the restroom without
adult supervision." In short, Timothy's school district sent him from a
safe school and a curriculum that was preparing him for college to an
unsafe school and a curriculum that was not even preparing him for
the eleventh grade.°
AEPs like Rebound are spreading around the country° School
districts see them as a potential panacea because they remove "at risk"
students—those who are pregnant, homeless, habitually truant,
charged with delinquency, or deemed discipline problems or academic
7 Id at 7.
8 Id. at 7-8.
9 Id. at 8.
18 Id. at 9.
" Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 10.
IS Id,
13 Id. at 10-11.
14 Id. at 10.
15 Id,
18 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 9, 11.
17 Id. at 23.
18 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
19 BRIAN KLEINER El' AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS AND PRO-
GRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATION FAILURE: 2000-01, at 2 (2002), available at
ttp://tices.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002004.pdf.
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failures—from public school rolls." Thirty-nine percent of public
school districts nationwide administered at least one AEP for at risk
students during the 2000-2001 school year. 21 The reasons fOr the trans-
fers, the duration of time that transferred students spend in AEPs, and
the ages of the students transferred vary broadly by state and by school
district.22 Some school districts place a student in an AEP for horseplay,
copying another student's work, inappropriate displays of affection, or
loitering in an unauthorized area. 23 Alternatively, other school districts
resort to AEP placements only for students who conunit serious infrac-
tions of school policy or the law.24 In addition, AEPs can be strongly
linked with a state's juvenile justice system. 25 Some students are as-
signed to AEPs when they are released from a juvenile correction cen-
ter or after they have been charged, though not necessarily adjudi-
cated, with an act that, if committed by an adult, would amount to a
felony. 26 Generally, students are referred to alternative schools and
programs if they are at risk of educational failure, as indicated by fac-
tors associated with early withdrawal from school, such as poor grades,
truancy, disruptive behavior, suspension, or pregnancy. 27 State AEP
transfer laws are alternately quite vague or quite specific about these
criteria, giving varying amounts of discretion to school officials, 28 In
20 Id.; JOIIN G. MoRGAN, TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TENNESSEE'S ALTER-
NATIVE Scitoots 27 (2000), available at wwwtennessee.gov/education/learningsupport/
doc/AlternativeEdReport.pdf; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-71(o) (LexisNexis 2005); CAL.
Entre-Com § 1981 (West 2002); Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.533 (West 2007).
21 KLEINER rr AL., supra note 19, at iii.
22 David D'Agata, Alternative Education Programs: A Return to 'Separate But Equal!", 29 NOVA
L. REV. 635, 643 (2005); see DEBORAH FITZGERALD FOWLER ET Al.., TEX. APPLESEED, TEXAS'
SCHOOL-IP-PRISON PIPELINE 66-67 (2007), available at www.texasappleseed.net/pdf/Pipe-
line%20Report.pdf; Elisa Hyman, School Push-Outs: An Urban Case Study, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 684, 684 (2005).
22 D'Agata, supra note 22, at 643.
24 Id.
26 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-209.1:2 (2006).
26 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-34.1, 12-15-71(o) (providing that a child who is sixteen
or older and charged with one of certain felonies and capital offenses must be transferred
to an alternative school); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-209.1:2 (permitting transfers to AEPs for
students recently released from a juvenile correctional center),
27 KLEINER ET AL., 514p173 note 19, at iii.
28 Compare LA. REV. STNI. ANN. § 17:224 (2007) (requiring only that a transferee ex-
hibit an "incorrigible attitude"), with VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-209.1:2 (requiring that the
transferee have committed specific offenses or have been expelled from school or released
from a juvenile correctional center).
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sonie states, schools can transfer children under the age of six to AEPs;
in other states, students must be at least fifteen to qualify for transfer. 29
This Note argues that, as currently constructed, many AEPs in-
fringe the substantive due process rights of students and their parents.
Part I of this Note examines the conditions at AEPs." Part II traces
the case law characterizing parents' fundamental right to guide their
child's education. 31 Part III reviews the case law on a student's funda-
mental right to a minimally adequate education and evaluates the
state of that right today. 32 Part IV examines the effect of prior legal
challenges to AEPs. 33 Part V argues that many AEPs infringe on the
fundamental rights discussed in Parts II and III because they are not
narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests. 34 These pro-
grams infringe parents' fundamental right to guide their child's up-
bringing by removing both the child and the child's education from
standards-based assessments, confounding parents' ability to evaluate
the quality of their child's education." In addition, these programs
infringe students' fundamental right to a minimally adequate educa-
tion by providing an alternative education that is not aligned with
state standards and can deprive students of the opportunity to earn a
high school diploma.36 Part V also briefly identifies solutions to prob-
lems with school discipline and at risk students' disengagement from
education that, unlike the current model of AEPs, are narrowly tai-
lored to the state's compelling in terests. 37
I. WHAT Is AN ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAM?
Alternative education originated in the 1960s as part of a move-
ment to provide alienated and disengaged students with individual-
ized instruction." At that time alternative schools served chronic tru-
29 FOWLER, supra note 22, at 5 (writing that Texas school districts referred 500 pre-K
and kindergarten students and 2700 first grade students to disciplinary AEPs in the 2005-
2006 school year); Hyman, supra note 22, at 684 (writing that in New York schools students
as young as fifteen and as old as twenty with a range of academic achievements, were told
they needed to go to a different school).
30 See infin notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 99-169 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 170-181 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 182-319 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
3,3 See infra notes 219-260 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 301-319 and accompanying text.
38 MORGAN, supra note 20, at 2.
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ants, teenage mothers, and students with learning disabilities who
chose to enroll in these programs. 89 Beginning in the 1980s, concerns
about disruptive student behavior, at risk students, and the dropout
rate led legislators, educators, and community leaders to reconsider
the voluntary nature of alternative learning environments. 40 School
districts nowadays can send a student to an AEP for a matter of days
or for a matter of years against the will of the student and the stu-
dent's family.'" Fear of school violence fostered the proliferation of
involuntary student assignments to AEPs across the country. 42 In addi-
don, fear bred federal, state, and local "zero-tolerance" policies, which
mandated students' removal from school for certain infractions and
expedited the spread of involuntary AEPs.43
Economics also encouraged the expansion of AEPs. 44 The compa-
nies that build prisons and detention centers capitalized on school dis-
tricts' burgeoning interest in exclusionary punishment methods, con-
vincing school districts to pay for new detention-like facilities:* Simul-
taneously, schools discovered that transferring students to AEPs could
be a lucrative venture because the amount of funding an excluded stu-
dent generates may still be available to the transferring schoo1.48 In ad-
dition, the federal No Child Left Behind Ace' ("NCLB") authorizes
funds for school districts to create AEPs, which NCLB touts as innova-
tive programs to prevent violence and drug use and to reduce disrup-
tive behavior. 48
Pressures in the classroom also spurred the crusade for AEPs. 4°
With the push for accountability, schools can boost test scores by re-
82 Jonathan Wren, Note, Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths—A Cure for 	 Ails
School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLY & 1.. 307, 342 (1995); see also CAMILLA
LEIIR ET AL., ALTERNATIVE SCII0OLS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF"IIIE STATES 4
(2004) (writing that alternative schools in the 1960s were premised on the idea that stu-
dents require different avenues for learning).
4° See LEIIR, supra note 39, at 21; MORGAN, supra note 20, at 2.
41 See LEIIR, supra note 39, at 14 (of the thirty-one states surveyed, six states reported
holding students in AEPs for more than one academic year, ten states reported holding
students in AEPs for a duration between seven months and one year, and nine states re-
ported holding students for a duration of only one to six months).
42 D'Agata, supra note 22, at 636; see Wren, supra note 39, at 347.
43 LEHR, supra note 39, at 21; see Augustina Reyes, The Criminalization of Student Disci-
pline Programs and Adolescent Behavior, 21 ST. JOIIN'S .J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 78 (2006).
44 D'Agata, supra note 22, at 639; see Reyes, supra note 43, at 77-78.
45 Reyes, supra note 43, at 77.
"D'Agata, supm note 22, at 639.
47 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. V 2005).
48 See id. § 7131.
49 See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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moving struggling students from their school rolls." Many teachers
complain that they are not trained to deal with the serious behavioral
problems they face in the modern classroom and cannot teach lessons
with these troubled students in their classes." Filially, unusually high
levels of school enrollment, which continue to exceed many schools'
capacities, compound the pressures to shrink the general education
population by any means possible. 52
Although AEPs differ from state to state and school to school, they
share common characteristics related to their purpose as behavior
remediation centers." AEPs utilize low teacher to student ratios, indi-
vidualized and self-paced instruction, and noncompetitive perform-
ance assessments. 54 In addition, AEPs typically rely on stringent restric-
tions and social controls, including constant supervision of students,
escorting students to the restroom in groups, and even police patrols. 55
Many AEPs group violent and disruptive students with students at risk
for academic failure, threatening the latter group's potential to suc-
ceed." Despite heightened social restrictions, studies show that stu-
dents in AEPs are subject to levels of violence that are dramatically
higher than those found in traditional schools. 57
As for academics, the material taught at AEPs may not coincide
with the material taught at a student's regular campus." Additionally,
the length of the instructional school day and school week may be
shorter at an AEP than at a regular school." As a result, school systems
56 Lunn. supra note 39, at 21; D'Agata, supra note 22. at 639; Reyes, supra note 43, at
77-78.
D'Agata, supra note 22, at 639; Reyes, supra note 43, at 77-78.
52 Lent, supra note 39, at 21.
53 See Letts, supra note 39, at 15; Reyes, supra note 43, at 80.
54 Stephen M. Cox, An Assessment of an Alternative Education Program for At-Risk Delin-
quent Youth, 36 j. RES. CRIME & I)u.INQ. 323, 323 (1999); D'Agata, supra note 22, at 643;
Wren, supra note 39, at 344.
D'Agata, supra note 22, at 643; Patty Blackburn Tillman, Procedural Due Process for
Texas Public School Students Receiving Disciplinary Transfers to Alternative Education Programs, 3
Tex. WEst.EYAN L. REV. 209, 223 (1996); Wren, supra note 39, at 344-45.
56 Audrey Knight, Redefining Punishment for Students: Nevares v. San Marcos I.S.D., 20 Rev.
Lrric;. 777, 793 n,81 (2001); Wren, supra note 39, at 352; Rodney Turpin Be Deborah Hinton,
Academic Success of At-Risk Students in an Alternative School Setting 37-38 (Spring 2000)
(unpublished Master's research paper, Campbellsville University),. available at http://
eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/con  ten tdelivery/servlet/ ERICServlet?accno = ED440814.
57 D'Agata, supra note 22, at 641; Wren, supra note 39, at 351.
58 See D'Agata, supra note 22, at 641; Tillman, supra note 55, at 223.
59 Brief of Appellant and Reproduced Record at 10, Tyson ex rel. Jefferson v. Sch. Dist.
of Phila., 900 A.2d 990 (Pa. Coatunw. Ct. 2006) (No. 1795 CD 2005), 2005 WL 5167474, at
90, appeal denied, 917 A.2d 316 (Pa. 2007); see, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 19-1901-C
(West 2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RECS. tit. 8, § 175.5 (2000).
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often penalize students on assessments or in grade advancement for
not learning what they were not taught at their AEP. 6° In a 2004 study,
researchers at the University of Minnesota found that a majority of
AEPs that responded to a survey had not fully integrated the state stan-
dards and curriculum into their program." Moreover, only nineteen
states reported having a system for tracking what becomes of students
who attend AEPs." Still fewer states reported tracking the results of
state-mandated tests, student enrollment in secondary school, or hiring
rates.65 The Minnesota survey identified quality of staff, accountability,
and meeting state academic standards as important issues facing alter-
native schools in the next few years." In addition, some studies have
found that alternative programs do not reduce delinquent behaviors. 65
Large percentages of students removed to AEPs never finish their edu-
cation; instead, some of these students turn to crime, drugs, and delin-
quency. 66 Because most AEPs neither participate in stale-mandated
tests67 nor track students' post-school academic or professional out-
el) See Tillman, supm note 55, at 223.
61 See LEHR, supra note 39, at 15.
62 Id. at 1 6.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 19.
65 Cox, supra note 54, at 323.
66
 FOWLER ET Al.„ supm note 22, at 27, 30; Joseph Linton, Teaching and Learning in the
Face of School Violence, I I GEO..). ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 553, 572 (2004); Wren, supra note
39, at 332-33.
67 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.7(a) (2) (i) (2008) (IA] State must determine and justify in its
State plan the minimum number of students sufficient to yield statistically reliable infor-
mation for each purpose for which disaggregated data are used."); id. § 200.20(a)(2)
("[T]o be included in the determination of [Adequate Yearly Progress] for a school ... ,
the number of students in the group must be sufficient to yield statistically reliable infor-
mation."); see also FOWLER rr AL., supra note 22, at 26 (writing that Texas does not require
state oversight of its disciplinary AEPs). AEPs rarely have enough students enrolled to yield
statistically reliable information, so, under NCLB regulations, they are generally exempt
from the requirement to make Adequate Yearly Progress ("AW") on the state's measurable
academic objectives. See 34 C.F.R. § 200.20(a). Compare LEHR, supra note 39, at 12 (stating
that total enrollment at nearly a third of all AEPs is below twenty-six students and at the
vast majority of AEPs it is below seventy-six students), with, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. Cone tit. 23,
§ 1.60 (2008) (stating that for the purposes of evaluating its public schools, Illinois defines
a subgroup as comprised of at least forty-five students). Furthermore, like other state edu-
cation departments before it, in 2006 the Massachusetts Department of Education
changed its testing polices to exclude results from students who were not enrolled in their
school as of October 1 of the fall preceding exams. See 34 C.F.R. § 200.20(e) (2) ("In de-
termining the AYP of a school, the State may not include students who were not enrolled
in that school for a full academic year, as defined by the State."). Compare Mass. Dep't of
Elementary & Secondary Educ., School and District Profiles Help, http://profiles.doe.
mass.edu/help/damaspx
 (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (explaining the October enrollment
reporting policy), with ELIZABETH G. HII,I„ CM,. LEGISLATIVE ANALYS•'S OFFICE, IMPROVING
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comes, decades deep in the AEP experiment, the question remains: do
AEPs provide a basic education ?65
II. PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROVIDE FOR
THEIR CHILD'S EDUCATION
In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 69 the U.S. Supreme Court established
one of the oldest fundamental liberty interests by holding that parents
have a fundamental right to guide the education of their children in
preparation for their station in life." In doing so, the Court struck
down a state law that prohibited all educators from teaching languages
other than English to students who had not successfully passed eighth
grade." Since Meyei; the Court has interpreted this right to preclude
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 22 (2007), available at lutp://www.lao.ca.gov/
2007/alternative_educ/alt_ed_020707.pdf (finding that California law exempts student
assessment data from a school's accountability score for students who were not enrolled in
that school in October), and LA. CODE R. tit. 28, pt. LXXXIII, § 4310(B) (1) (a) (i) (Weil
2007) (providing that Louisiana students' state assessment scores are exempted if the stu-
dents were not enrolled at the school on October 1). Because many students are not trans-
ferred into AEPs until October, state policy changes like these create additional exemp-
tions from NCLB's accountability testing for AEPs. See HtLL, supra, at 22 (writing that Cali-
fornia's attendance rule results in the federal determination of AYP being based on only a
small proportion of the students who attended an AEP and that forty-five percent of Cali-
fornia's AEPs are eliminated from the state's Academic Performance Index because they
did not have enough scores from students who satisfied the state's attendance policy).
68 LEHR, supra note 39, at 21; see also LAUDAN V. ARON, URBAN INST., AN OVERVIEW OF
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION 11 (2006), available at littp://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411283_alternative_education.pdf ("[T] here is no way of determining what gaps are in the
system .... [This] prevents policymakers from moving onto the larger and more compel-
ling questions about the quality of academic programs ...."); SUSAN BRODY HASAZI ET
AL., VT. 1)EP'T OF EDUC„ REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION SCHOOLS/PROGRAMS IN
VERMONT 19 (2001) ( - 11 .1t would be difficult at this time to assess the state-wide impact of
alternative programs on student performance and continuation in school."); MORGAN,
supra note 20, at i ("Alternative schools lack systems of accountability to ensure program
quality.").
" 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). The Court also noted that the public education system
Plato desired, which was strikingly similar to the model Sparta used, would, if imposed in
the United States, infringe upon this fundamental right. Id. at 401-02. Plato's public edu-
cation system mandated the removal of all children from their families to be reared and
educated by official guardians. Id. The Court suggested, however, that the fundamental
right involved in Meyer foreclosed any government power to standardize American chil-
dren by wholly removing their education from their parents' supervision. Id. at 402.
7° Id, at 399-401, 403; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 95 (2000). But see
Herndon v. Chapel Hill -Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 179, 179 (4th Cir. 1996) (find-
ing that rational basis review is appropriate for an analysis of a parent's substantive due
process challenge to a graduation requirement that all students perform fifty hours of
community service).
7L Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-02.
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the state from "contract[ing] the spectrum of available knowledge,""
and other courts have construed it to preclude state interference with
parents' ability to seek instruction in benign topics for their children."
In effect, Meyer established that part of the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is the right to seek useful knowledge without
state interference." •
In 1925, just two years after its decision in Meyer; the Court ruled in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters that the fundamental liberty interest established
in Meyer prohibits a State from compelling its students to attend public,
as opposed to private, schools." In Pierce, the plaintiffs, a Catholic
school and a private military school, sought to enjoin enforcement of a
state law requiring parents to send their children to a public school."
The Court held that those who nurture a child and direct his destiny
"have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations," which may entail entrusting an institu-
don other than a public school with the child's education." Today,
Pierce is characterized as an affirmation of parents' fundamental consti-
tutional right to determine who shall educate and socialize their chil-
dren." In 2000, in an opinion concurring in Troxel v. Granville, Justice
Sower wrote that Pierce means even a state's considered judgment
about the preferable character of a student's schoolteachers is not enti-
tled to prevail over a parent's choice of school."
In effect, Pierce and Meyer posited a negative substantive due
process right for students to acquire useful knowledge. 8° In other
words, parents have a fundamental right to be free from state inter-
vention while evaluating their child's education in light of their own
values and making any subsequent decisions to offer their children
additional learning opportunities.m The Supreme Court reaffirmed
72 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
73 See Herndon, 89 F.3d at 178 (citing Meyer. 262 U.S. at 400) (noting that it "is a right of
parents to seek German instruction for their children").
74 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Consti-
tution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. I. Rt:v. 550, 564
(1992); Peter S. Smith, Note, Addressing the Plight of Inner-City Schools: The Federal Right to
Education after Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 Wit 'Trim L REV. 825, 835 (1997).
79 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
76 Id. at 530-32.
77 Id. at 535.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-79, 80 (Sower, J., concurring); see id. at 65 (plurality opinion).
79 Id. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
Bitensky, supra note 74. at 593.
at Sec Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1090-91,
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this right in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 82 In Yodel; the state's compul-
sory education laws conflicted irreconcilably with the right of Amish
parents to choose not to send their children to school after eighth
grade for religious reasons.° The Court held that a state's interest in
universal education, no matter how important, must be balanced with
the traditional interests of parents in leading and shaping their fami-
lies' values." The Court drew significantly from the conclusions in
Pierce, reiterating that because parents have a fundamental liberty in-
terest in directing their children's education, the state has no power
to force all children within its borders to accept instruction from pub-
lic school teachers only.° Additionally, the Court elaborated on the
reference in Pierce to "additional obligations" for which parents have a
right and duty to prepare their children. 86 Under Yoder, these obliga-
dons include the inculcation of moral standards and elements of
good citizenship, which parents may feel is most effectively taught in a
particular facility or system. 87 Finally, the Court distinguished the fact
pattern in Yoder from situations where parents have only a general,
rather than a religious, interest in the nature and education of their
children: where only a general interest is involved, the Yoder Court
held that a state acts reasonably and constitutionally in requiring edu-
cation in a school that meets the standards prescribed by the state. 88
The lower courts have construed Yoder much less expansively then
its predecessors, Pierce and Meyer, limiting its relevance to cases where a
state law threatens a long-established religious community's way of
life, 89 The Amish community's strong claim to Free Exercise, given the
community's longstanding religious practice, has therefore become
1112,1114 (1992) (writing that Pierce and Meyer endowed parents with a fundamental right
to control their own children—a right under which children serve as conduits for their
parents' religious expression, cultural identity, and class aspirations—and, therefore, that
state reform efforts may not tamper with parental efforts to align their child's develop-
ment with their values).
52 406 U.S. 205,233-34 (1972); see Woodhouse, supra note 81, at 1114-15 (writing that
Yoder ratified the Aleyer and Pierce view of children as tools of their parents).
53 }Met; 406 U.S. at 208-09; see also Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134,144 (2d Cir.
2003) (referring to an Irreconcilable Yoder-like clash").
a4 Yoder, 406 U.S, at 214.
eo Id. at 232-33.
86 Id. at 233.
117 Id.
aB Id.
'0 See, e.g., Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144.
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integral to the Yoder decision and has been hard for later plaintiffs to
replicate."
In Leebaert v. Harrington, decided in 2003 by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, a father attempted to rely on Yoder and its
predecessors to overcome a state law that forced his son to attend a
mandatory health class that discussed drugs, alcohol, and peer resis-
tance to social pressures. 91 To distinguish Leebaert from Meyer and Pierce,
the court differentiated positive and negative rights." The court wrote
that in Meyer and Pierce the fundamental right at issue was a negative
one, a right against the state preventing parents from choosing a spe-
cific educational program. 93 In Leebaert, on the other hand, the plaintiff
was seeking a positive right for parents to dictate the curriculum at the
school to which they chose to send their children. 94 Both policy and
precedent militated against the recognition, of such a sweeping positive
right.95 Thus, although parents have a fundamental right to choose the
nature of the education their children receive, they do not have the
right to pick and choose elements of the education offered within the
public schools.96
Through this chain of parental rights cases, the courts have recog-
nized and reaffirmed the existence of parents' fundamental negative
right to guide their child's education without. undue interference by
the state.97 Founded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
9° See id.; Halderman v. Penn hurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702,707 (3d Cir. 1983).
Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 137-38.
92 See id. at 141.
93 Id.
" Id.
93 Id. at 141-42; see also Bitensky, supra note 74, at 575 (noting that mainstream legal
thought construes the Constitution as a series of negative rights protecting Americans
against governmental intrusion).
96 See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197,1206 (9th Cir. 2005); Leebaert, 332
F.3d at 141.
97 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206; Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141. It is
worth noting that Herndon applied rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, to a
case where the parents relied on their fundamental right to guide their children's up-
bringing to challenge the school district's application of a graduation requirement to their
children. 89 F.3d at 176-77,179. Herndon, however, does not contravene the existence of
parents' negative fundamental right to guide their child's education because, by seeking to
have their students avoid an element of their public education, the Herndon parents
wrongly interpreted their fundamental right as a positive, rather than negative, one. Com-
pare id., with Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141. As discussed in Leebaert, the right arising from Meyer
and Pierce is not a positive right that permits parents to dictate a curriculum to public
schools; it is a negative right that forces parents to leave the composition of a public educa-
tion up to the public schools. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141.
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Amendment, this right bars the government from obstructing or con-
tracting a child's acquisition of knowledge against the parents' wishes."
III. THE QUASI-FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Thomas Jefferson wrote that it is the business of the state to edu-
cate the common people. 99 In line with this statement, Jefferson pro-
moted a central role for the federal government in ensuring that a free
public education was provided to all children.'" His contemporaries
and the other Framers shared Jefferson's belief that, under the Consti-
tution, the national government would shoulder a direct and pivotal
responsibility for ensuring an adequate public education system was in
place. 101 George Washington and James Madison made education one
of their foremost concerns. 192 Across the board, the Framers did not
believe a public school system was merely incidental to liberty, but
rather that the federal government had a duty to create and protect a
public education system on a national scale.'" Reflecting this view, in
1787 the Congress of Confederation declared in the Northwest Ordi-
nance that knowledge was necessary to good government and that
education would forever be encouraged.'" Pursuing this policy, the
federal government required territories applying for statehood to set
aside land for educational purposes.'" During the second half of the
nineteenth century, the federal government also required that territo-
ries applying for statehood establish public school systems. 1" This in-
98 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141.
°° Michael Salerno, Note, Reading Is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act Neces-
sitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CAnnozo Pun. L. Poi.'v & tcs J.
509, 514 (2007) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Jan. 4,
1786) (northeast wall of the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.)).
Bitensky, supra note 74, at 588; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972);
Salerno, supra note 99, at 514.
net Bitensky; supra note 74, at 627, 629; see 147 CoNG. REC. 20,348 (2001) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (quoting John Adams as saying, The education of a nation instead of be-
ing confined to a few schools and universities for the instruction of the few, must become
the national care and expense for the formation of the many.").
102 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 628.
1" Id. at 627, 629; sec 147 CON G. Rm. 26,348-49 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
10  Bitensky, supra note 74, at 628; Salerno, supra note 99, at 514.
195 Marla Valdez, Note, Constitutionality of Educational Land Grants and Mississippi State
Property Interests Under Review in Papasan v. Attain, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 199, 203 & n.23,
204 (1988); see also Bitensky, supra note 74, at 628-29 (noting that with the exceptions of
Texas, Maine, and West Virginia, the federal government endowed every state admitted to
the Union after 1802 with lands for public education).
1" See Robert Vogel, Sonora of the 1889 North Dakota Constitution, 65 N.D. L REV. 331,
331 ii.1, 332 11.5 (1989) (stating that the Enabling Act, which permitted the residents of
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vestment in the budding nation's education system paid off, and, by
1830, the northern states were developing a system for public educa-
tion. 107 At the end of the nineteenth century, public primary and high
schools were in operation across the country, and compulsory school-
ing laws quickly followed suit)" Between 1890 and 1930, enrollments
in public high schools doubled each decade) 09
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, Chiefiustice Warren, for the
Supreme Court, echoed Jefferson's sentiments writing, 'Today, educa-
tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments."no Nevertheless, in 1973, the Supreme Court ruled in San Anto-
nio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that education is not a funda-
mental constitutional right)" The Rodriguez plaintiffs challenged a
Texas school financing system that resulted in affluent districts receiving
close to $600 per student and more impoverished districts receiving
closer to $350 per student; they argued this system infringed the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses be-
cause it deprived the students of their fundamental right to an educa-
tion. 112 The plaintiffs specifically contended that education, unlike
other socially important rights and liberties, was essential to the effective
exercise of other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 113
This was a "rights combination" argument of the ilk the Court had pre-
viously accepted)" What makes Rodrigua unusual in Supreme Court
jurisprudence is that the Court accepted the plaintiffs' arguments but
the territories of Montana, Washington, and the Dakotas to form constitutions and state
governments, included as a prerequisite to statehood ordinances for the establishment of
universal public school systems).
Thomas J. Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under the United States Constitution,
29 WILIAM rrrE L. Mx. 279, 289 (1993).
Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586.
Dm Id.
110 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
111 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
112 Id. at 12-13, 17.
112 Id. at 35.
" 4 Walsh, supra note 107, at 286. In Griswold V. Connecticut, 85 U.S. 479 (1965), the Su-
preme Court accepted a similar "rights combination" argument, finding that there is a
fundamental right to privacy located in the combined penumbras of other constitutionally
protected rights. Walsh, supra note 107, at 286; see Griswold, 85 U.S. at 484. These argu-
ments hinge on the notion that, without the unenumerated right, the other, enumerated,
fundamental rights have no practical effect. See Walsh, supra note 107, at 286. Therefore, if
the enumerated rights are to have an effect, they must be read to imply, when combined,
another fundamental right that is not explicitly listed in the Constitution. See id. In the
context of Rodriguez, the penumbras of the right to vote, the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech, and, Walsh argues, also the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
combine to imply a fundamental right to education. Id. at 286-87.
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ruled in the defendant's favor." 8 First, the Court agreed with the plain-
tiffs that the right to receive information is meaningless when its recipi-
ent has not been taught lo read or to assimilate and utilize knowl-
edge." 8 Second, the Court concurred that the electoral process de-
pends on an informed electorate, specifically voters with sufficient
reading skills and developed thought processes to enable them to cast
ballots intelligently)"
Consequently, the Court never rejected the nexus between educa-
tion and the exercise of one's constitutional rights." 8 Rather, it refused
ut Rodriguez to acknowledge an infringement of a fundamental right
out of fear and because the plaintiffs alleged only unequal funding, not
that an inadequate education was being provided to the students." 9
particular, the Court was afraid that recognizing education as a funda-
mental right would open the floodgates to claims to other fundamental
rights that, although biologically or socially important, are not explicitly
acknowledged in the Constitution.'" The Court also feared that the
judiciary lacked the expertise and familiarity with local problems to in-
terfere with education systems) 21 Despite its fears, the Court ultimately
accepted the plaintiffs' arguments and observed that, under a different
set of facts, an "identifiable quantum of education" could be a constitu-
tionally protected prerequisite to the exercise of other fundamental
rights) 22 The Court did not elaborate on this seemingly discordant ob-
servation because the Texas financing system did not appear to deny
any educational opportunities.' 28 Instead of a denial of a minimally
adequate education, the pleadings in Rodriguez alleged only a differ-
ence in educational funding, which had no statistically sound correla-
tion to the quality of education provided) 24 Nevertheless, the idea that
there may be a fundamental right to an identifiable quantum of educa-
"5 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36.
115 Id. at 35.
117
 Id, at 36.
115 Id. at 35-36.
t" Joshua Wyner, Note, Toward a Common Law Theory of Minimal Adequacy in Public
Education, 1992 ANN. Sults'. Am. L. 389, 394 (1993); see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37, 41-42.
13° See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
121 See id. at 36, 41-42.
122 Id. at 36; Bitensky, supra note 74, at 567-68; Smith, supra note 74, at 837-38.
123 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 43; Smith, supra note 74, at 838.
121 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37, 42-43 ("[O]ne of the major sources of controversy con-
cerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expen-
ditures and the quality of education.").
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tion lives on as Rodriguez's "upheld holding." 125 The Court recognizes
this inconsistency, citing Rodriguez both for the proposition that there is
no fundamental right to education and for the proposition that there
may be a fundamental right to education."6
In 1982, the Supreme Court affirmed Rodriguez in Plyler u Doe, find-
ing that education is not a fundamental right but holding that allega-
tions of educational deprivation may warrant a heightened level of
scrutiny anyway. 127 The issue in Plyler was whether Texas could, consis-
tent. with the Equal Protection Clause, deny undocumented school-age
children a free public education. 128 The Court held the Texas law un-
constitutional because, by depriving children of an education, it im-
posed tremendous social costs on the country and the affected children
and, therefore, could only be considered rational if it furthered a sub-
stantial state goal."9 Thus, the Court applied an unusual form of
heightened scrutiny to the Texas law, requiring that it not merely be
rationally related to a legitimate state goal but be rationally related to a
substantial state goal.'"
What remains unclear about Plyler is whether the Court thought
heightened scrutiny was appropriate solely because of the countervail-
ing costs involved in the denial of educational opportunities or be-
cause, in addition to denying the plaintiffs educational opportunities,
125 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 566; Matthew A. Brunel!, Note, What Lawrence Brought
for "Show and Tell": The Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25
B.C. TIIIRD Woittit L.J. 343, 353-54 (2005).
126 Wyner, supra note 119, at 394. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
("Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution."), with Pa-
pasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) ("M his Court has not yet definitively settled the
questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right . . . .").
127 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
128 Id. at 205.
129 Id. at 223-24, 230. For the children, some of the costs described included: the
stigma of lifelong illiteracy; a lifetime of personal, professional, and psychological hard-
ship; and an inability to live within America's civic institutions. Id. at 222-23. For the na-
tion, the Court believed that denying children an education cost the country the potential
benefit of having these children contribute to its economic, cultural, civic, and military
progress. See id. at 221-23.
13° Id. at 223-24, 230; Bitensky, supra note 74, at 568; Wyner, supra note 119, at 395.
Note that this form of scrutiny is stricter than rational basis review, which requires a show-
ing that the regulation is rationally related to achieving a legitimate state interest, but is
not quite intermediate scrutiny, which requires a showing that the regulation is substan-
tially related to achieving an important governmental objective. Compare Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (defining rational basis review), and United States v. Vir-
ginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 569 (1996) (defining intermediate scrutiny), with Plyler, 447 U.S.
at 223-24 (requiring a showing that the law be rationally related to a substantial state goal).
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the Texas law created a "disabling classification 	 in applying only to
undocumented children. 152 Of the three concurring justices, only jus-
tice Marshall identified the reason for the heightened review without
equivocation."3 To Justice Marshall, heightened scrutiny was appro-
priate for the simple reason that education was a fundamental
right."4 The other two justices, Justice Blackmun and justice Powell,
joined the majority's opinion in all its ambiguity but wrote separately
only to emphasize both the unique importance of education and the
unfairness of targeting a particular group for educational privation."3
The essence of their concurrences is significant, however, as they both
argue that intermediate review is appropriate for claims that a legisla-
tive action will create an underclass of citizens." 6 Ultimately, the Plyler
131 Smith, supra note 74, at 842; see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24. In Piykr, the Court as-
serted that the law affected a '`discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling
status.' 457 U.S. at 223. This statement hints at funding that undocumented inirnignint
children are a suspect class, which would then require heightened review, but the Court
never decided that issue. See id.; Salerno, supra note 99, at 523-24 (noting that Plyler can be
read to hold that a basic education must be preserved for all children or to read that ille-
gal immigrant children are a class that, like classifications by gender. should be afforded
intermediate scrutiny). At most, the Court suggested that personal culpability may have a
role to play in determining what is and is not a suspect classification. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at
223 (stating that when a group violates federal law, the fact of that violation is not constitu-
tionally irrelevant to a suspect-class determination). Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent,
railed against this suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause precludes legislators from
classifying among persons on the basis of characteristics over which those individuals lack
control. Id. at 244-45 (Burger, CI, dissenting).
132 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had
engaged in a "quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis"); Bitensky, supra
note 74, at 568 ("Wt. the Rodriguez Court opened the door to a positive right to education,
the Piper majority may have momentarily straddled the threshold,"); Smith, supra note 74,
at 842 ("The question, then, is whether one construes the holding of Plyler narrowly on its
facts or broadly as signaling the Court's shift towards heightened scrutiny regarding educa-
tion.").
13 ' Compare Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that education is a
fundamental right and therefore implying that allegations of its denial require the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny), with id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that allegations
of the complete denial of education warrant heightened scrutiny because it is the ana-
logue of the denial of a right to vote and because its victims are at an insuperable disadvan-
tage), and id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that allegations of the denial of edu-
cation warrant heightened scrutiny because the denial of education threatens to create a
permanent underclass).
134 Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
133 Sec id. at 234-36 (Blaclirnund., concurring); id. at 236-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
136 Sec id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Children denied an education are
placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage ... [Old when
those children' are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State's
action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass."); id. at 238-39 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ( -These children thus have been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma.
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majority's tergiversation has led the Court to interpret . the decision as
a once-in-a-lifetime confluence of a quasi-suspect class determined by
a trait for which the class's members are not responsible and a quasi-
fundamental right."7 Its authors, however, never intended Plyler to be
so narrowly interpreted as to be effectively irrelevant." 8 Consequently,
when the Supreme Court first announced that Plyler had only negligi-
ble value in educational rights cases, most of the justices on the Court
who had participated in Plyierdissen ted. 138
In 1986, the Supreme Court faced another suit challenging a dispar-
ity in financial support for a state's public schools in Papasan v. A(lain) 4°
Drawing on its approach in Rodriguez, the Court held that education is
not a fundamental right, but it explicitly noted that the Court "has not
yet definitively settled the question [1 whether a minimally adequate educa-
tion is a fundamental right ...." 141 The Court also stated that this par-
ticular lawsuit did not require the resolution of the question. 142 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the petitioners had failed to allege that the
children were denied a minimally adequate education because, so far as
it could tell, the schoolchildren in the under-funded counties received
instruction in reading, writing, and the educational basics."3
Papasan also limited the reach of Rothiguez's deference to local
control, stating that Rodriguez did not stand for the proposition that all
A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens
and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
1" See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450,459 (1988) (refusing to extend
Plyler beyond its "unique circumstances" or allow it to govern a case in which a child was
allowed to attend public school but her parents could not pay for her bus transportation to
the school);. Brian B. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 230 F.3d 582,586 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding, in a
challenge to a law mandating that youths convicted and sentenced as adults receive only
the education afforded expelled students, that heightened scrutiny did not apply because
the burden on education did not disadvantage a discrete class of innocent children).
138 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 472-73 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, the author of the court's opinion in Plyler, and Justices Mar-
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun, who were among the majority in Plyler, dissented from the
Court's refusal in Kadrmas to acknowledge Plyler's relevance to the review of mandatory
school bus fees. See id. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 472-73 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
139 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Of the seven justices who heard Plyler and were still on the Court when Kadrmas was
decided, four dissented, including Justice Brennan, the author of the Plyler opinion. See id.
at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 478 U.S. at 274.
141 Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
t42 Id. at 286.
145 Id.
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school funding schemes resulting in financial disparities between
schools are automatically constitutional."4 Instead, the Court found
that Rodriguez only controlled funding disparities based on differing
local wealth because the disparities may be a necessary adjunct of allow-
ing meaningful local control over school funding. 145 Papasan, however,
involved a disparity resulting front the state's distribution of federal as-
sets that the state held in trust for the benefit of its public schools,
rather than a disparity resulting merely from the natural variations in
local wealth around the state)" Having distinguished the issues in Pa-
pasan from those in Plyterwhere the plaintiffs did plead a deprivation
of a minimally adequate education—and Rodriguez (where the disparity
was the result of variations in local wealth), the Court remanded the
case for consideration of whether assets the federal government
granted to the state for the use of state schools could be distributed un-
equally among school districts by the state."' In effect the Court found
that some disparities in public education are not related to local con-
trol, and, in these cases, the Court has the expertise necessary to review
their constitutionality. 148 The parties in Papasan ultimately settled, stipu-
lating in a consent judgment that the disparities in school funding vio-
lated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendmen t. 149
The most recent Supreme Court case to consider whether educa-
tion is a fundamental right is Kadrmas u Dickinson Public Schools, decided
in 1988) 5° The plaintiffs in Kadrmas challenged the defendant school
district's decision to charge each child using the district's door-to-door
bus serlice. 151 The plaintiffs were a family of five who lived sixteen miles
from their eldest child's school and whose annual income was near the
144 Id. at 287.
145 Fapasan, 478 U.S. at 288.
146 See id. at 287-88.
147 Id. at 289.
145 Sec id. at 286 (hinting that the judiciary should review allegations of a denial of a
minimally adequate education when made); id. at 289 (writing that the judiciary must
decide whether the variations in school benefits are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest). This restrains, if not undermines, the suggestion in Rodriguez that the judiciary is
ill-equipped to review local education decisions. Compare id at 286,289, with Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 36,41-42.
149 Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the
Equal Protection Clause to Challenge School Finance Disparities Caused try Inequitable State Distribu-
tion Policies!, 7 TEx. F. ON C,i... & C.R. 191, 151 & n.75 (2002).
155 487 U.S. at 458.
151 id at 453-55.
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officially defined poverty leve1. 152 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the de-
fendant school district from collecting any fee for bus service and con-
tended that it unconstitutionally deprived indigent children of access to
a basic education. 153 In the meantime, the eldest child continued to at-
tend school although she was denied access to the school bus. 154 Writing
for the Court, Justice O'Connor reiterated that education is not a fun-
damental right. 155 In addition, the Court said it had "not extended
[Plyler] beyond the 'unique circumstances' that provoked [it]," and
therefore chose not to apply heightened scrutiny. 156 Justice O'Connor
then distinguished Kadrmas from Plyler on two counts: first, unlike the
undocumented children in Plyler, the Kadrmas child was not punished
for the illegal conduct of her parents but rather for their refusal to pay a
user fee; second, the user fee would not, in the Court's opinion, pro-
mote the creation of a subclass of illiterates and add to the problems
associated with unemployment, welfare, and crime. 157
The precedential value of Kadmitis is uncertain. 158 One reason is
that the case can be framed as either an equal access to education case
or a right to transportation case. 159 Whether Justice O'Connor's con-
clusions are dicta or significant conclusions depends upon how the case
is characterized. 169 More importantly, the case did not address the ques-
tion of whether children have a fundamental right to a minimally ade-
quate education. 161 Therefore, the fundamental right to a "minimally
adequate" or an "identifiable quantum" of education recognized by
Papasan and Rodriguez remains undiminished. 162
152 Id. at 454-55.
153 Id. at 458.
154 Id.
153 Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
156 Id. at 459. It is unclear what supports this statement: the Court cites no case, and
Papasan does not justify it. See id.; Stuart Riegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental
Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas
v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74 Cokrat, L. REV. 1078, 1098 (1989); see also Papasan, 478
U.S. at 285 (stating that Plyler supports the theory that a minimally adequate education
may be a fundamental right). Instead, the Court appears to rely solely on patched together
quotes from Justice Powell's concurrence and Chief justice Burger's dissent in Plyler. See
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459.
157 Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459.
158 See Smith, supra note 74, at 842.
159 Id.
leo Id.
161 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 572; Kristen Safier, Note, The Question of a Fundamental
Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN, L. Rev. 993, 1006 (2001); Smith, supra
note 74, at 842.
162 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 573; see Safier, supra note 161, at 1006.
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In the wake of these four cases, all of which avoided deciding
whether a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education exists,
one commentator has suggested that the Court will never decide the
issue. 163
 Few plaintiffs have pleaded the facts necessary to support an
allegation of a school depriving a student of a minimally adequate edu-
cation.'" In Craig v. Selma City School Board, decided by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama in 1992, however, the plain-
tiffs did plead the necessary facts: the court held that the allegations
that a principal had refused to permit expelled students to send a rep-
resentative to retrieve their schoolbooks presented a possible substan-
tive due process violation because there was no legitimate governmen-
tal end in depriving the students of their books. 165
Additionally, in 1993, in Donnell C. v. Illinois Board of Education, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that stu-
dents in a correctional facility pleaded a denial of a minimally adequate
education when they alleged that they were not being taught courses
other than reading and math, did not have textbooks or other instruc-
tional materials, and were not given learning disability assessments.' 66
The court wrote that these were "serious factual allegations of a lack of
instruction on even the educational basics" and therefore stated a claim
under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.' 67 Donnell
C. has since been cited for the proposition that juveniles in correctional
facilities have a federal constitutional right to an adequate educational
program. 168
 It therefore suggests that a heightened level of scrutiny
should be applied to cases where the plaintiffs allege a denial of a
minimally adequate education. 169
163 Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the
Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw. U. L. Rix. 1038, 1042 (1992). hlaggs suggests that the Court will
never decide the issue because so many state constitutions guarantee a right to a free edu-
cation that a federal lawsuit may never be worthwhile. Id. Additionally, he suggests that
petitioners may never have a set of facts that would entitle them to challenge an education
system on substantive due process, rather than equal protection, grounds. Id. at 1042-43.
1 " E.g., Donnell C. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Craig v. Selma City Sch. Bd„ 801 F. Supp. 585, 596 (S.D. Ala. 1992); see also Maggs, supra
note 163, at 1042-43 (noting that plaintiffs rarely have a set of facts on which to argue that
an education is not minimally adequate and, without those facts, the Court will continue to
evade the issue).
168 801 F. Supp. at 596. The Craig court, therefore, implied that rational basis review
should apply to educational deprivations. See id.
166 829 F. Su pp. at 1018.
10 Id.
168 State ex tel. S.D., 832 So. 2d 415, 434 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
log See 829 F. Supp. at 1018.
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IV. CHALLENGES TO ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
This Note has described two theories of fundamental rights that
are potentially infringed by the operation of most AEPs: parents' right
to avoid state abridgment of their children's education and students'
right to a minimally adequate education. 1 " This Part examines legal
challenges to AEPs as violations of the fundamental rights discussed
above. 371
The landmark case challenging a disciplinary transfer to an AEP
is the 1997 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Nevares v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District. 172 As
discussed above, the San Marcos High School principal transferred
Timothy Nevares to an AEP after learning that the police had de-
tained the student for an alleged aggravated assault.'" Timothy and
his father informed the principal that Timothy had acted in self-
defense and then sued for a declaratory judgment on the unconstitu-
tionality of the transfer statute.'" The court of appeals, noting that
Timothy was merely transferred from one school program to another
with stricter discipline, held that Timothy was not denied access to
public education. 175 Because Nevares was a procedural clue process,
rather than a substantive due process, challenge to the Texas AEP
transfer law, the court did not consider whether the transfer satisfied
the fundamental educational rights of Timothy and his parents.'"
Like Nevares, the legal challenges to AEP transfers have focused on
procedural due process issues, challenging the procedural safeguards
against wrongful transfers, rather than challenging the inadequacy of
the education provided at AEPs. 177 Consequently, the courts deciding
170 See supra notes 69-169 and accompanying text.
171 See infra notes 172-180 and accompanying text.
172 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997).
172 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. To support its reasoning, the court relied heavily on Arundar v. DeKalb County
School District, 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980), which found no protected property interest was
implicated in a school's refusal to offer a student certain courses of study. See Nevares, 11l
F.3d at 27; Arundar, 620 F.2d at 494.
176 See Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26-27. It is also worth noting that, as in Kadnnas, the alleged
harm never materialized in Nevares: just as the bus fee never, ultimately, prevented Sarita
Kadrmas from getting an education, the school never, ultimately, transferred Timothy
Nevares to au AEP. Compare Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S 450,458 (1988), with
Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26.
177 E.g., Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 668 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding no due process
violation in connection with a student's transfer to an AEP after narcotics were discovered
in the student's locker); Everett v kfarcase, 426 F. Stipp. 397, 399-400 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (de-
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these cases have always been able to assume that AEPs amount to noth-
ing more than a different course offering or a different public school,
neither of which a student has a right to choose. 178 The federal courts
have yet to confront an AEP transfer as a denial of either a minimally
adequate education or parents' right to avoid state abridgment of their
children's education, 17" This litigation strategy ignores the central
complaint of AEP critics that AEPs effectively warehouse students
rather than provide them with the education for which their parents
termining, so as to enter an order in addition to a consent decree, that some kind of due
process procedures are constitutionally required in disciplinary AEP transfers).
178 E.g., Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26; cf. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
2003) (denying parent's right to dictate curriculum). Note that just because a student has
no right to an education at a particular school does not mean that parents do not have a
right for their children to receive an education at the school in which they were enrolled.
See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005); Seamons v. Snow, 84
F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 n.5 (10th Cir. 1994); C.B.
v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 n.5 (11th Cir. 1981); Arundar, 620 F.2d at 494. Nevares relies on
Seamans for the proposition that a student has no constitutional right to be educated at a
particular school, but Seamons involved a plaintiff who voluntarily transferred out of the
school at which his parents had originally enrolled him. Compare Nevares, II 1 F.3d at 27,
with Seamans, 84 F.3d at 1234. Thus, unlike the AEP cases, the school took no affirmative
action in that case to remove him from the school against his parents' wishes. See Seamons,
84 F.3d at 1234. Similarly, Bagan, which Driscoll cites for the proposition that a student has
no constitutional right to choose a particular public school, also involved a parent's desire
to transfer her child from a school, rather than a school's. Compare Driscoll. 82 F.3d at 389
n.5, with Bagan, 41 F.3d at 576. The school rejected the mother's transfer request because
the new school could not accommodate the student's special education needs. Bagan, 41
F.3d at 57611.5. Again, unlike the AEP cases, the school in Bagan took no affirmative action
to remove the student from the school against his parents' wishes. See id. at 576. Underly-
ing the proposition that a student has no constitutional right to be educated at a particular
school is the assumption that all schools in a district are approximately equal in terms of
the educational opportunities they offer. Everett, 426 F. Supp. at 400. In other words, ad-
ministrative transfers (or the refusal to comply with a requested transfer) are permissible
because the state is not abridging the educational opportunities afforded to the student.
See id. When the transfer does significantly abridge those opportunities, however, parents'
fundamental right against state abridgement of their child's educational opportunities
conies into play. See id. at 401, 403 (writing that when the state transfers a student to an
AEP and thereby restricts that student's educational opportunities, the parent must be
provided notice and the right for a prompt, informal hearing so that the decision to trans-
fer is subject to the parents' right to guide their children's education).
r,"9.
	
Nevares, Ill F.3d at 26; Zamora, 639 F.2d at 668, 670; Everett, 426 F. Supp. at
399. In Driscoll, however, the plaintiff did allege a substantive due process violation, but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit foreclosed it in light of McKinney v. Pate, 20
F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), a case foreclosing pretextually terminated employees from
basing causes of action on substantive due process violations. Compare Driscoll, 82 F.3d at
389, with McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560-61. Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit wrongly extended a
principle of its employment law to an education case, ignoring Supreme Court precedent
to the contrary. Compare Driscoll, 82 F.3d at 389, with AlcKi nney, 20 F.3d at 1560-61, and
supra notes 110-169 and accompanying text.
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enrolled them in schoo1. 180 Part V of this Note advances potentially vi-
able legal challenges to AEPs that would address the programs' in-
fringements of students' and parents' fundamental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.t 8'
V. POTENTIAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
There are two untested substantive due process challenges to the
current system of AEPs. 182 First, AEPs infringe parents' fundamental
right against state abridgement of their ability to guide their child's edu-
cation.' 13 Second, they deny a student's fundamental right to a mini-
mally adequate education.' Section A of this Part examines the viability
of the first, and Section 13 examines the second. 185 Section C critiques
the "compelling" interests guiding the current operation of most AEPs
and argues that AEPs are not narrowly tailored to advance state goals.' 86
Section D recommends alternative discipline policies and AEP models
that are closely tailored to the alleged goals of the AEP boom. 187
A. Parents' Fundamental Right and AEPs
As demonstrated in the Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder line of cases, par-
ents have a fundamental right to direct the education of their chil-
dren without significant state intervention." 8 In 2003, in Leebaert
Harrington, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit charac-
terized this right as a negative right: parents cannot claim a funda-
mental right to dictate which classes and mandatory school activities
their children will and will not attend. 189 Rather, the government can-
1110
	 supra note 39, at 349: see D'Agata, supra note 22, at 641.
181 See infra notes 182-319 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
Ia' Sec Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Bitensky, supra note 74, at 563
n.86; Smith, supra note 74, at 834.
184 See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 188-270 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 271-300 and accompanying text.
187 See infra notes 301-319 and accompanying text.
188 Woodhouse, supra note 81, at 1091, 1112; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214,
232-33 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Afeyer, 262 U.S. at
400-01.
189 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003).
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not strip parents of educational options for their children.'" Addi-
tionally, the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
have each acknowledged that parents may choose to send their child
to a particular schoo1. 191
Nevertheless, when a school assigns a student to an AEP, the gov-
ernment simultaneously abridges the educational options available to a
student and strips parents of their right to decide which school their
child should attend. 192 Because students can be transferred to an AEP
for actions as harmless as quietly failing or being homeless, neither the
students nor their parents have necessarily waived their liberty interest
in an education.'" The state, through its schools, can nevertheless uni-
laterally remove students to AEPs with or without consulting the stu-
dent's parents and, although the parents can appeal the decision
through administrative channels, the decision remains in the hands of
the state.'"
In unilaterally transferring students to AEPs, the government
contracts the realm of knowledge available to students.'" The states
substitute programs carefully integrated with state standards for pro-
grams that may deviate so significantly from those standards that the
student may be unable to earn a diploma in the usual number of
years. 196 The effect can be analogized to that of the law struck down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923 in Meyer v. Nthraska. 197 The law
prevented students below ninth grade from learning a foreign lan-
guage from an "educator." 1" If the students' parents knew a foreign
19° See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Herndon v. Chapel-Hill Carrboro City Bd. of Educ.,
89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1996); Bitensky, supra note 74, at 564 n.86: Smith, supra note 74,
at 834.
391 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005); see C.N. v. Ridge-
wood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185-86 n.26 (3d Cir. 2005); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub.
Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005).
192 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 10-11; Tillman, supra note 55, at 223; see also
Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (stating that parents may decide whether to send their children to
public school).
193 E.g., CAL. Enuc. CODE § 1981 (West 2002); sec KLEINER ET AL, supra note 19, at iii;
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 582 (1975) (students whose presence poses a "con-
tinuing danger" to persons, property, or the academic process may be immediately re-
moved from school despite their liberty and property interests in receiving a public educa-
tion).
194 See, e.g., Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir.
1997).
195 See LEHR, supra note 39, at 15; Tillman, supra note 55, at 223.
1" Seei,Eirit, supra note 39, at 15; Tillman, supra note 55, at 223.
197 262 U.S. at 401-03.
195 See id. at 401.
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language, they could teach it to their children, but the students could
not learn the language in school.m Because foreign language is a use-
ful subject, however, the Court ruled that the state could not abridge
its availability to parents looking for a school that would instruct their
children in a foreign language before they passed eighth grade. 200
Nevertheless, like the state law in Meyer; many AEPs effectively ban
their students from receiving instruction in a curriculum aligned with
state standards."' Like the parents in Meyer; who made deliberate
choices about the education of their children, parents today choose to
enroll their children in particular public schools believing that those
schools will provide their children with at least a minimally adequate
education.402 Therefore, in an AEP transfer, the state can undermine
parental control by unilaterally restricting a student's educational op-
portunities in direct violation of parents' right to decide to offer a
broader swath of educational opportunities to their children. 2°3
Moreover, banishing a student to an AEP removes the student
from a school that participates in state accountability testing to a
school that does not. 204 This substitution replaces a school where the
parents can monitor both the school and the student's progress rela-
tive to state and national standards with a school where this compari-
son is no longer possible. 205 Consequently, the state blindfolds the
child's principal educational advocates, thus preventing parents from
learning about inadequacies in their child's education and restraining
their ability to supplement their child's education accordingly. 206 The
199 See id. at 400-01.
200 See id.; see also Herndon, 89 F.3d at 178 (describing Meyer as standing for the proposi-
tion that it is within the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment for parents to
seek foreign language instruction for their children).
201 See LEHR, sup: note 39, at 15.
202 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01; see also Pierre, 268 U.S. at 534-35; C.N., 430 F.3d at 185
n.26; Everett v Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (describing the assumption
that all schools provide a basic education).
002 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401; Tillman, supra note 55, at 223.
2" See supra note 67.
2°2 Compare Lim., supra note 67, at 22, and LEHR, supra note 39, at 16, with 20 U.S.C.
§§ 6301. 6311(h) (Supp. V 2005). Under the statement of purpose for NCLB, a school's
participation in accountability systems and standards-based assessments should enable
parents and other stakeholders in a student's education to measure that child's perform-
ance relative to common expectations of student achievement. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301. In line
with this, NCLB mandates that states make school report cards available in an understand-
able format to parents and the public. Id. § 6311(h).
200 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6311(h); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78-80 (Souter, J.,
concurring); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.300 (2008) (describing the role of the parent as the
child's main educational advocate in special education and requiring schools to obtain
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Supreme Court has made clear that where a state's affirmative act re-
strains an individual's freedom to act on his or her own behalf, Due
Process Clause protections apply. 207
Finally, in addition to contracting the realm of knowledge avail-
able to a student and blindfolding parents to that reality, transfers to
AEPs strip parents of their fundamental right to choose the school
that their child auends. 208 In making their original decision about
where to educate their child, parents consider a host of factors, in-
cluding their child's strengths and weaknesses, their capacity to pay
for and transport their child to and from a school, a school's reputa-
tion, and its success relative to state and national standards. 209 Many
families go so far as to base their decision about where to buy a house
on their decision about which schools they want their children to at
 The Constitution protects the parents' right to make this de-
cision: Pierce v. Society of Sisters, decided by the Supreme Court in 1925,
recognized that parents have the right to choose who will educate and
socialize their children. 211 The parents' right to choose a school for
their children is so important that it prevails over a school's well-
reasoned judgment about the character of students' teachers. 212 Con-
sequently, when a school transfers a child to an AEP with a curriculum
the parent distinctly did not choose for that child, the state infringes
parental consent before evaluating a child for disabilities and again before providing spe-
cial education services).
711 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
200 Sec Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-80 (Souter, J., concurring); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; C.N.,
430 F.3d at 185 n.26; Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206; Blau, 401 F.3d at 395.
2" See, e.g., Jerry Cheslow, A Town Where Water Lovers Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002,
at J5 (listing as selling points for homes in Monmouth Beach, New Jersey the ability of
elementary school students to walk to school and go home for lunch; the school's new
media center, music room, and computer lab; and the high percentage of teachers with
master's degrees); John Rather, Great Site for Schools, Paths and Trains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2002, at J5 (listing as selling points for homes in Great Neck, New York, the school dis-
trict's per pupil spending, its students' success in a variety of competitions, the schools'
higher than average SAT scores, and the option for Great Neck high school students to
spend a semester working or studying in a field of interest to them).
210 See supra note 208.
211 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-80 (Sauter, J., concurring); Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206; see Pierce,
268 U.S. at 534-35.
212 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-80 (Sauter, J., concurring); see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 177 (1976) (stating that Yoder held that the state cannot preempt the educational
process by requiring children to attend certain schools); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer,
262 U.S. at 400.
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the parents' fundamental right to make all of the long-term educa-
tional decisions for their children. 213
A major concern with recognizing a public school's action as an
infringement of a parent's fundamental right is that parents, rather than
the school, will dictate each student's curricula. 214 Recognizing the con-
stitutional invalidity of AEPs, however, would not set this dangerous
precedent.216 Unlike Lee/veil, where ruling in favor of the parents would
have permitted parents to tell the state what to teach their children, rul-
ing in favor of the parents in an AEP case would not impose impractica-
ble burdens on the state. 216 Instead, finding in favor of the parents in an
AEP case would merely prevent states from unilaterally abridging the
educational opportunities available to a child without giving parents the
opportunity to evaluate the education subsequently provided to their
child.2" Recognizing that an AEP infringes parents' substantive due
process rights will not force those schools to develop a new curriculum
for each student whose parents disagree with the one provided. 218 Con-
sequently, the policy concerns that occasionally militate against parental
control of a student's education would not apply. 219
B. Student's Fundamental Right and AEPs
A student's right to receive a minimally adequate education is of a
fundamental nature. 220 Courts have typically been hesitant to recognize
this right because of concerns that it would hinder local legislative con-
trol over schools and place it in the hands of the federal judiciary. 221
213 See Troxel, 268 U.S. at 78-80 (Souter, J., concurring); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; C.N.,
430 F.3d at 185 n.26; Fields, 427 F.3d at 1205-06.
214 Sex Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14; Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206; Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., 68 F,3d 525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995).
213
 See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141; Brown, 427 F.3d at 533-34,
218 See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141; Brown, 427 F.3d at 533-34.
217 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
218 C.f. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534 (finding the Constitution does not impose a burden on
states to cater a curriculum for each student whose parents have moral disagreements with
the school's choice of subject matter).
219 See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 141; Brown, 68 F.3d at 534.
229 See Papasan v. Albin, 478 U.S. 265, 274 (1986) (reiterating that a minimally ade-
quate education may be a fundamental right); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223, 230 (1982)
(holding that the denial of a basic education requires a heightened level of scrutiny); San
Antonio lndep. Sch. Dim. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (stating that all "identifiable
quantum of education" may be constitutionally required); Donnell C. v. Ill. State Bd. of
Educ., 829 F. Supp, 1016, 1018.(N.D. III. 1993) (finding that the plaintiffs have a claim for
a denial of a minimally adequate education under the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause).
221 Salerno, supra note 99, at 510; see, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41,
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Whatever legitimacy this concern may have had in 1973, when the Su-
preme Court held in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues
that there is no fundamental right to education, for decades now state
education systems have not been under purely local control—which is
especially true in the wake of NCLB.222 Moreover, with the creation of
state standards for grade advancement and graduation, states now de-
fine quite clearly what a minimally adequate education is, and the judi-
ciary no longer would have to undertake a state legislature's role to en-
force a student's right to receive a "minimally adequate" education. 223
AEPs have not generally integrated these state standards into their
curricula, nor are they held accountable for doing so. 224 In addition,
the few standardized state test scores available for AEPs indicate that
the students are not receiving a minimally adequate education. 225 In
2004 at an alternative school in Springfield, Massachusetts, one hun-
dred percent of the third graders were not proficient in reading, one
hundred percent of the sixth graders were not proficient in math, and
one hundred percent of the tenth graders were not proficient in Eng-
lish. 225 These test scores were far from unusual: alternative schools
across the state reported similar scores in 2003, 2004, and 2005. 227 Since
the release of these test scores, Massachusetts changed its policy so that
alternative schools no longer need to report their abysmal perform-
ance .223 Nevertheless, these test scores indicate that the education at
AEPs is not just inferior to the education at regular public schools but
shockingly substandard, and they raise the question: if no student at
these schools is proficient in all three educational basics (reading, writ-
ing, and math), do these students truly have access to a minimally ade-
quate eclucation? 229
222 Salerno, supra nate 99, at 511-12, 538-39. Unlike the year when Rodriguez was de-
cided, states are now so dependent on the federal government to finance their public edu-
cation systems that the concept of the local nature" of education is absurd. Id. at 538.
229 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (requiring that states develop rigorous standards that
meet certain federal specifications); see, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.140 (2008);
005-000-006 WYO. CODE R. § 7 (Weil 2008).
224 Ammt, supra note 68, at 11; LEuR, supra note 39, at 15, 21; HASAZI FT Al.., supra note
68, at 14; MORGAN, supra note 20, at i.
229 See, e.g., Memorandum from Katherine Lipper, Ctr. for Law & Educ., to Kathleen
Boundy 25 (Aug. 11, 2006) (hereinafter Cu-. for Law & Educ. Memo] (on file with author).
228 Id.
227 Id. at 25-27.
228 Mass. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., supra note 67; see supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
229 See Salerno, supra note 99, at 534 n.182 (comparing two state supreme courts' defi-
nitions of a basic education under their state constitutions); Smith, supra note 74, at 857;
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Despite these concerns, some commentators disapprove of relying
on the Fourteenth Amendment to alter a current school policy or pro-
cedure. 230 These conunentators can draw hope from the fact that al-
though U.S. district courts have acknowledged a substantive due proc-
ess right to receive a minimally adequate education, the Supreme
Court has yet to formally classify it as fundamental. 23 i Additionally, the
Court worries that recognizing a "new" fundamental right is dangerous
because there are only scarce and open-ended guideposts for responsi-
ble decision-making in that area, leaving cases vulnerable to determina-
tion by reference to policy preferences and personal values. 232 Despite
these concerns, a child's interest in receiving a minimally adequate
education does satisfy the test, as described by the Supreme in 1997 in
Washington v. Glucksberg, for recognizing unenumerated fundamental
rights.233 Under the Glucksberg test, the Court first narrowly defines the
asserted liberty interest. 234 Next the Court determines whether this de-
fined right is fundamental based on the tradition and history of protec-
tions for that interest and whether that interest is necessary to the con-
cept of ordered liberty. 235 A child's interest in attending a school that
provides a minimally adequate education meets these requirements: it
is fundamental based on our tradition and history, and it is necessary to
the concept of "ordered liberty."236
1. The Tradition and History of Protecting the Right to Education
Since before the . founding of our nation, education was a pro-
tected interest and considered implicit to ordered liberty. 237 Before
the Congress of Confederation made its sweeping statements about
the importance of education in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the
see also Papasart, 478 U.S. at 286 (speculating on what kinds of pleadings would allege the
deprivation of a minimally adequate education).
238 E.g., Maggs, supra note 163, at 1045; Smith, supra note 74, at 846.
231 Compare Donnell C., 829 F. Stipp. at 1018, and Craig v. Selma City Sch. Bd., 801 F.
Stipp. 585, 596 (S.D. Ala. 1992), with Kadrrn.-ts v. Dickinson Public Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458
(1988).
232 Joseph F. Kadlec, Note, Employing the Ninth Amendment to Supplement Substantive Due
Process: Recognizing the History of the Ninth Amendment and the Existence of Nonfiindamental
enumerated Rights, 48 B.C. 1.. REV. 387, 392 (2007).
233 See 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586; Smith, supra note
74, at 850.
231 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Kadlec, supra note 232, at 391.
233 Glucksbetg, 521 U.S. at 720-21; Kadlec, supra note 232, at 391.
238 Smith, supra note 74, at 850; see Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586.
477 Smith, supra note 74, at 850; see Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586,
226	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 50:197
colonies had already established local schools. 238 Even before that the
New England Poor Laws required local governments to assure that
parents and guardians taught their children basic literacy. 239
As noted above, the Framers, early presidents, and their contem-
poraries all considered an educated populace necessary to the survival
and health of the republic.24° The Framers believed the federal gov-
ernment had a duty to create and protect a public education system on
a national scale. 241 Interestingly, they thought much more highly of the
role of education in their new republic than they did of the role of
popular elections. 242 It seems that our Founding Fathers believed an
effective public education system was an essential underpinning of
popular elections and, knowing that such a system was not yet in place,
they approached popular elections with caution. 243 Specifically, the
Framers expressed concern that the common people were uninformed
and uneducated and therefore incapable of acting rationally in a de-
mocratic society. 244 Consequently, on the one hand, the Founding Fa-
thers and their peers worked tirelessly to support a minimally adequate
public education system while, on the other hand, they disenfranchised
people they did not deem sufficiently educated to vote. 245 These seem-
ingly opposite positions in fact reveal the Framers' keen awareness of
the nexus between a minimally adequate education and a self-governed
democracy: without the former, the latter could not exist. 248
This concern for the effects of enfranchising an uneducated pub-
lic shaped and linked the expansion of voting rights and a basic educa-
238 Satter, supra note 161, at 999.
239 Susan P. S tuart,  Fun with Dick and Jane and Lanirrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as
Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ, L. REV. 563, 623 11.368 (2004).
24° Bitensky, supra note 74, at 628; see 147 CONG. Rec. 26,348-49 (2001) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
2" 147 CONG. Rec. 26,348-49 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); Bitensky, supra note 74, at
627, 629.
242 Compare Bitensky, supra note 74, at 627-29, with Walsh, supra note 107, at 288-89.
243 Compare Bitensky, supra note 74, at 627-29, with Walsh, supra note 107, at 288-89.
2" Walsh, supra note 107, at 288-89. Elbridge Gerry, for example, said, 'The people
are uninformed and would be misled by a few designing men." Id. The Framers rejected
popular election of the president and senators, preferring to rely, respectively, on the Elec-
toral College and state legislative bodies instead. Id.
242 Compare Bitensky, supra note 74, at 628-29 (detailing George Washington's, James
Madison's, and Benjamin Rush's efforts to create a federal university as well as Noah Web-
ster's creation of the first national curriculum), with Walsh, supra note 107, at 288-89.
246 See Bitensky, supra note 74, at 629; Walsh, supra note 107, at 288-89; see also Stuart,
supra note 239, at 624 (stating that Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin sowed the seeds for
democratic imperatives to drive the development of American education).
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don throughout the country's development. 247 After the Civil War, Con-
gress passed the Fifteenth Amendment, marking the first-time that the
Constitution affirmatively protected the franchise.248 At the same time,
Congress conditioned the reentry of the Confederate states into the
Union upon a guarantee of public education to all children within
their borders, and the First elements of the future Cabinet-level De-
partment of Education were put in place. 249 Consequently, when the
Reconstruction Amendments were ratified, there was an understanding
that every state would provide every child with a basic education. 25°
Accordingly, by the turn of the century, thirty-eight states had con-
stitutions containing provisions supportive of state-provided education,
and twenty-nine states had constitutions boasting affirmative obliga-
tions for state governments to provide public education. 2" Shortly
thereafter, in 1913, the states ratified the Seventeenth Amendment,
formally undoing the indirect voting system that the Framers had
thought was so vital to the health of the republic. 252
In the twentieth century, the expansion of suffrage continued to
parallel the expansion of a basic education, with all three branches of
government taking major strides to protect citizens' rights in both ar-
eas.255 In just the last thirty years, Congress passed the Education for All
247 See Stuart, supra note 239, at 624 (linking the development of American education
with the goals of democracy). Compare Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional
History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. GIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346-59 (2003) (describing the expan-
sion of affirmative protections for universal suffrage from the eve of the American Revolu-
tion through the twentieth century), with Sailer, supra note 161, at 998-1001 (describing
the expansion of affirmative protections for a minimally adequate education from before
the ratification of the Constitution through the twentieth century).
243 Karlan, supra note 247, at 1350.
2' 9 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 588; see Safter, supra note 161, at 1000.
250 See Bitensky, supra note 74, at 588.
2" Id. at 586-87.
252 See U.S. Senate, Direct Election of Senators, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senatorslitm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
2" See, e.g., National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(1958) (improving teacher-training nationwide and math, science, and foreign language
instruction); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953) (striking clown segregated schools
as unconstitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 650-51, 666 (1944) (striking down
white primaries as unconstitutional). After World War I, the federal government initiated
an educational grant program, and the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, which
enfranchised American women. Karlan, supra note 247, at 1353; Sailer, supra note 161, at
999. The New Deal allocated funds for education and school construction, and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt called for an Economic Bill of Rights that would include the right to
a good education. Sailer, supra note 161, at 999-1000. During and after World War II,
Congress passed a series of acts expanding both education and suffrage in the name of
national security. E.g., National Defense Education Act, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(1958) (improving teacher-training nationwide and math, science, and foreign language
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Handicapped Children Act 254 and the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act,255 and the executive branch consolidated the federal De-
partment of Education. 256 More recently, the U.S. witnessed the intro-
duction of Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 257 and No Child Left Be-
hind, 258 each bill providing additional layers of protection for the right
to a minimally adequate education. 259
In sum, our history demonstrates that a student's right to a mini-
mally adequate education is indeed, and traditionally always has been, a
fundamental right. 260 It also demonstrates a deeply rooted relationship
between the expansion of education and the expansion of the fran-
chise, a relationship on which the Founders premised their original
electoral system. 261
2. A Basic Education Is Implicit in the Concept of "Ordered Liberty"
U.S. history illustrates the parallel growth of public education and
universal suffrage.262 As a result, it manifests a national concern that
healthy democracy relies on voters' ability to intelligently cast ballots,
instruction); Serviceman's Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 3451 (2000)) (providing educational services to re-
turning veterans); Absentee Voting in Time of War, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136 (1944)
(repealed in full 1955). At the same time, in 1944, the Supreme Court struck down white-
only primaries as unconstitutional. See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 650-51, 666 (holding the right
to vote in a general election cannot be abridged by a state on account of race). In 1953,
the Court struck down white-only public schools as unconstitutional, See Brown, 347 U.S. at
495 (holding the right to an education, where the state has undertaken to provide it. must
be made available to all on equal terms). Less than ten years later, the states ratified the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, banning poll taxes, and Congress passed the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89.10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
254 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975). In 1990, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act was amended and re-
named the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). See Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1487 (2006)).
255 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1987.
256 Safier, supra note 161, at 1000.
257 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5918 (2000).
259 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. V 2005).
259 See 147 CONG. Rtc. 26,348-49 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); Salerno, supra note 99,
at 514-15.
260 See Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586; Smith, supra note 74, at 850; cf. Gluchsberg, 521
U.S. at 710, 720-21 (holding that the recognition of an urienumerated right as fundamen-
tal requires examining the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices to determine
whether the liberty is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition).
26t See supra notes 292-253 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 297-259 and accompanying text.
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which in turn establishes the nation's acceptance of education as im-
plicit to the concept of "ordered liberty: "263 The Framers acknowledged
this nexus when they expressed concern that the common people were
uninformed and uneducated and therefore incapable of acting ration-
ally in a democratic society. 264 They also formalized it in the Northwest
Ordinance, declaring that education is necessary for good govern-
ment. 266 Additionally, the Court has announced and relied upon this
nexus throughout its jurisprudence.266 As Justice Marshall pointed out
in his dissent in Rodriguez, education receives special protection because
it both enables and encourages citizens to exercise their rights. 267 Of all
the great minds who articulated the relationship between democracy
and education, scholar and jurist Benjamin Cardozo perhaps captured
it most eloquently, writing: 'There is no freedom without choice, and
there is no choice without knowledge—or none that is not illusory:266
In sum, our history and our definition of liberty demonstrate that
a student's right to a minimally adequate education is indeed, and tra-
ditionally always has been, a fundamental right—a right that has be-
come more implicit in our concept of ordered .liberty with the expansion
of suffrage. 269 Moreover, although international law may have at most a
supplemental value to American jurisprudence,270 this nexus between
education and political rights is broadly recognized in the modern
263 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680-81 (2002) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 225.
264 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
265 Salerno, supra note 99, at 514.
266 E.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 680 (1W)ithout education one can hardly exercise the
civic, political, and personal freedoms ... ."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 ("We have recognized
'the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government.' and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which
our society rests.'"); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (accepting the proposition that the democ-
ratic ideal depends upon an informed electorate); Yoder. 406 U.S. at 221 (accepting the
proposition that ''some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence"); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("[E]ducation is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.").
267 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113, 114-15.
268 Bitensky, supra note 74, at 550 (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LE-
GAL SCIENCE 104 (1928)).
269 See Bitensky, supra note 74, at 586; Smith, supra note 74, at 850; suers notes 237-268
and accompanying text; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710, 720-21.
270 See, e.g. , 	 v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (noting the position of the
European Court of Human Rights in a substantive due process analysis); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (stating that the reality of international law is not control-
ling but may be instructive in an Eighth Amendment analysis).
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!Western legal tradition. 271 Therefore, AEPs that do not provide mini-
mally adequate educations to their students, but instead substantially
abridge their students' educational opportunities, infringe upon this
fundamental right and do a great disservice to our notion of a free de-
mocracy.
C. Narrowly Tailored to Meet Compelling State Interests
Having shown in Sections A and B of this Part that AEPs infringe
on both a recognized and an unrecognized fundamental right, this Sec-
tion examines whether these AEPs would survive strict scrutiny and ar-
gues that they would not.272 Under strict scrutiny, which the Court ap-
plies in all cases alleging the infringement of a fundamental right, the
state carries the heavy burden of showing that its actions are narrowly
tailored to meet compelling state interests. 273 The Court uses the "nar-
rowly tailored" test to police against means that are over- or under-
inclusive: a law with a poor fit suggests that the government does not
really believe the underlying ends are so compelling. 274 The operation
of AEPs does not survive strict scrutiny because, even where the states'
interests are compelling, the AEP system is not narrowly tailored to ad-
vance those interests. 275
States have a compelling interest in maintaining an ordered school
environment, one in which students are safe and can learn without sig-
nificant distraction.276 This interest has encouraged the removal of
many students from regular education classrooms to AEPs. 277 In prac-
tice, however, AEP transfers are over-inclusive, removing far more chil-
dren than are actually disruptive or have committed disruptive acts. 278
271 E.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art, 14, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1, 11; A. v. Essex County Council, [2007] EWHC (QB) 1652 (U.K.); see Brunel], supra
note 125. at 347.
272 See infra notes 273-319 and accompanying text.
273 Clucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985); Smith, supra note 74, at 836.
274 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 803 (2006).
275 Compare id. at 800-01, with infra notes 276-301 and accompanying text.
276 See Nerernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Citify. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 513 (1969); C.H. ex. rel. Z.H. v, Oliva, 226
F.3d 198, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000).
277 See D'Agata, supra note 22, at 639; Reyes, supra note 43, at 77.
276 See ARON, supra note 68, at 10; FOWLER Er AL„ supra note 22, at 66-67; MORGAN, CU-
M note 20, at 27. Students are transferred to AEPs for any number of reasons, including
reasons beyond their control, such as homelessness or an undiagnosed learning disability,
and reasons that do not disrupt the in-classroom environment, such as pregnancy, irregu-
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AEPs are also tinder-inclusive: a survey of Texas teachers found that
despite a steady increase in punitive AEP transfers over the last ten
years, eighty-seven percent of the teachers surveyed stated that it was no
easier now than ten years ago to maintain discipline in the classroom. 279
Additionally, the National Association of School Psychologists has said
that it considers primarily punitive alternative programs ineffective at
preventing future behavioral problems. 28° The National School Boards
Association has also found that rather than rehabilitating disruptive
students, removing troublemakers from the classroom can harden de-
linquent behaviors and alienate troubled youths from school. 281 This
finding is reflected in a report issued by Texas Appleseed, citing disci-
plinary transfers to AEPs as the source of learned negative behaviors,
which students who did not traditionally pose discipline problems
picked up from other students during their stint in an AEP. 282
Another theory behind AEP transfers is that they improve the
education of all students by enabling every strident to receive more per-
sonalized instruction.283 Again, this is a compelling interest, but AEPs
are not narrowly tailored to advance this interest. 284 Statistics show that
AEPs do not achieve this mission. 285 Although some students in the
regular education environment may access a slightly higher quality edu-
cation in the absence of peers who are pregnant, homeless, failing, or
allegedly involved in an off-campus felony, the students who have been
removed access a significantly lower quality education—one that does
not meet state or national standards. 286 AEP transfers impede students'
academic achievement in three ways. 287 First, the stigma attached with a
transfer makes it harder for young children to relate positively to
lar attendance, and out-of-school brushes with the law. See ALA. CODE § 12-15.71(o) (Lex-
isNexis 2005); ARON, supra note 68, at 10; FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 67..
279 FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 28. During the year when the survey was con-
ducted, the 2005-2006 school year, Texas school districts made approximately 100,000
disciplinary transfers. See id. at 26.
280 MORGAN, supra note 20, at 18.
tat D'Agata, supra note 22, at 643; Wren, supra note 39, at 332.
292 FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 26.
tai D'Agata, supra note 22, at 640; Wren, supra note 39, at 347.
294 See infra notes 285-294 and accompanying text.
265 See FOWLER ET Al.., supra note 22, at 32 (writing that as AEPs academic standards are
lowered, instruction is not aligned to state standards, and grades are inflated); D'Agata,
supra note 22, at 641 (writing that although the mission of Texas's AEPs is to enable stu-
dents to perform at grade level, the programs are not required to provide the grade-level
curricula); Ctr, for Law & Educ. Memo, supra note 225, at 25-27.
286 See LEIIR, supra note 39, at 15; Ctr. for 1..aw & Educ. Memo, supra note 225, at 25-27.
287 See FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 26-27.
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school. 2m Second, as discussed above, the lack of accountability elimi-
nates the positive effects of parental and state oversight of the class-
room.289 Third, the loss of time in classrooms with high standards and
direct teaching sets AEP transferees behind their peers academically. 299
Frustrating a child's access to a minimally adequate education in this
manner does not comport with the purpose of NCLB or local laws
mandating state standards and accountability testing. 291 In addition,
students who endure repeated referrals to AEPs are five times more
likely to drop out than peers who were not referred to AEPs. 292 Along
these lines, documentation produced by the Massachusetts Department
of Education also showed that AEPs have the lowest graduation rate in
the Commonwealth.293 Consequently, instead of leaving no child be-
hind, AEPs leave many children behind, many of the same children
NCLB seeks to educate. 294
To defend curricula that are not aligned with state standards,
schools may argue that the students at AEPs are so far behind relative
to their peers that they cannot handle a standards-based program and
corresponding assessments. 295 This argument is deeply flawed. 296 Stud-
ies show that poor classroom behavior has no correlation to students'
ability to succeed academically. 297 Moreover, high expectations are
222 Id. at 27.
289 See id. at 26; supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
292 FOWLER Er AL., supra note 22, at 26-27,32.
291 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (stating that the purpose of NCLB Is to ensure that all chil-
dren have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and
reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards
and state academic assessments" through a combination of "high-quality academic assess-
ments, accountability systems, teacher preparation and training, curriculum, and instruc-
tional materials" that are aligned with challenging academic standards); see also, e.g., 005-
000-006 Wvo. Com.: R. § 7 (Weil 2008) (requiring public school students to meet "Com-
mon Core of Knowledge" requirements).
292 FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22. at 27.
299 Bob Bickerton & Paula O'Sullivan, Mass. Dept of Educ., Defining the Dropout Cri-
sis Through Graduation Rates 15 ( Jan. 26,2007), available at http://www.renniecenter.
org/DOE%20Grad%20Rate%20Presentation.ppt.
294 Compare FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 4-5,27 (finding that minority and special
needs populations are overrepresented in AEPs), and D'Agata, supra note 22, at 655, with
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (stating that the purpose of NCLB is to ensure that all children, but par-
ticularly delinquent, disabled, and minority children, obtain a high-quality education and
reach proficiency on challenging academic standards).
295 William L. Taylor, Assessment as a Means to a Quality Education, 2 GEO. J. ow POVERTY
L. & Pm's' 311,314 (2001); see also D'Agata, supra note 22, at 640 (writing that proponents
of AEPs see them as facilities where children can reflect and build their self esteem).
296 See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
2" Benedict Carey, Studies on Pupils Say Bad Behavior Is Not Dooming, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13,2007, at Al.
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one of the most important components of a high quality education,
and the states' low expectations for their AEP students will be re-
flected in these students' substandard levels of achievement. 298 Meas-
ures of a school's progress and success at instructing its students and
delivering a minimally adequate education are vital in order to hold
those schools accountable.2" no one pays attention to the quality of
the education delivered at AEPs, the education delivered at AEPs will
likely fall far short of being "minimally adequate," which is the reality
in school districts around the country."° Given the discrepancy be-
tween the interests AEPs allegedly serve and the reality of their im-
pact, many AEPs are not narrowly tailored to advance those interests
and, therefore, cannot survive strict scrutiny."'
D. Some Narrowly Tailored Solutions
States and school systems have always needed leeway to experi-
ment with new tactics and policies to combat the innumerable chal-
lenges they face. 802 Nevertheless, some experiments are so poorly tai-
lored to their goals that they cannot survive strict scrutiny303 In these
situations, it is not up to the judiciary to dictate solutions to the states,
but the judiciary must ensure that the states' solutions protect parents'
and students' fundamental rights. 304 tension between individual
298 See C. Patrick Proctor. Teacher Expectations: A Model for School Improvement, 84 ELE-
MENTARY SCH. J. 469, 469 (1984); Taylor, supra note 295, at 311; Editorial, Mind the Gap,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2007, at B10.
299 See 20	 § 6301(1).
38° See FOWLER ET AL, supra note 22. at 26, 32; Hui., supra note 67, at 1 ("1T1he state's
accountability system allows schools and districts to use referrals to alternative schools as a
way to avoid responsibility for the progress of low-performing students.").
301 See supra notes 276-300 and accompanying text.
902 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43, 50.
908 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that state election contribution caps infringe on the fundamental right
to engage in political speech because they are not narrowly tailored to advance the state's
interest in preventing actual and apparent political corruption); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 935 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (stating that requiring a physician, rather than a
counselor, to inform a woman about the risks of an abortion is not narrowly tailored to the
state's interest in protecting maternal health and therefore is not constitutional).
"4 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of fustice 93
HARV, L. REv. 1, 11 (1979). Fiss suggests that the exercise of judicial power is limited only
by the existence of constitutional values, to which the judiciary must give concrete mean-
ing. Id. He recognizes, though, that this theory of structural reform can lend itself to abuse
at the hands of judges. Id. at 11, 15. According to Fiss, this abuse is constrained, perhaps
even prevented, by ensuring that the meaning-giving process is both pluralistic, in that it
engages multiple branches of government, and dialectical. Id. at 15, 16.
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rights and state policies maintains a healthy stream of conversation
about how schools can tailor their tactics to address new, and some old,
challenges.305
In that vein, AEPs are not necessarily a failed experiment in every
state and district that uses thern. 306 Instead there are some existing
policies and plans that are narrowly tailored to advance the compelling
interests driving AEP referrals. 307 Effective AEPs provide intensive in-
struction in credit-earning coursework and use research-based instruc-
tional techniques that engage the students.308 These narrowly tailored
AEPs maintain their low student-teacher ratios, set high expectations
for their students' achievement, and use functional assessment proce-
dures to evaluate students' success. 809 They avoid mingling students at
risk for academic failure and other nondisruptive at risk students with
students who demonstrate emotional and behavioral problems. 310
Additionally, there are school-wide discipline programs that reduce
disciplinary transfers to AEPs, boost instructional quality, and improve
staff morale.3 " Federal government studies of these and other discipline
programs recommend that, instead of reliance on the AEP-transfer
model, schools should improve school discipline with a combination of
research-based bullying prevention programs, positive behavior support
systems, instruction in conflict resolution, small classes, peer tutoring,
and cooperative learning. 312 Additionally, these reports recommend in-
305 See id. at 11, 14-16, 58. Fiss posits that all government is engaged in the process of
meaning-giving, attempting to give meaning to constitutional values so as to define Amer-
ica's moral identity See id. at 11, 14. Within this scheme, the judiciary straddles the world
of the ideal and of the practical. Id. at 58. On the one hand, the judiciary is the most capa-
ble player in this conversation to determine the 'true meaning" of these values, but, on the
other, the judiciary is not necessarily the most capable player to determine how to give that
meaning a reality,. Id. Therefore, the judiciary's ideal involvement is, when asked by an
injured party, to further the dialectical process of giving meaning to public values. Id. at
15-16.
306 See Ann Fitzsimons-Lovett, Alternative Education Programs: Empowerment or Entrap-
ment?, in AnnuEssiNG THE SOCIAL, ACADEMIC, AND BEHAVIORAL NEEDS OF STUDENTS WI111
CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR IN INCLUSIVE AND ALTERNATIVE SEVEINGS 37, 40 (Lyndal M.
Bullock & Robert A. Gable eds., 2001); Turpin & Hinton, supra note 56, at 36.
307 See Fitzsimons-Lovett, supra note 306, at 40; Turpin & Hinton, supra note 56, at 36.
3138 FOWLER. ET AL., 511Pra note 22, at 93; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SAFEGUARDING OUR
CHILDREN: AN ACTION GUIDE 33 (2000), available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/
safety/actguide/action_guide.pdf.
3" Fitzsimons-Lovett, supra note 306, at 39, 40; see U.S. DEPT or EDUC., supra note 308,
at 34.
310 Turpin & Hinton, supra note 56, at 37.
311 FOWLER ET Al.„ supra note 22, at 84.
312 Id. at 86-88; see, e.g.,JuN IL L. ANNETTE & MARJORIE C. WALSLEBEIV, U.S. DEE'T OFIUS-
TIC.E1UVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN; COMBATING FEAR AND RES1ORING SAFETY IN SCHOOLS 3
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creasingly intensive interventions rather than AEP referrals to address
the needs of the most chronically disruptive or "at risk" students." 3
These interventions require increased teacher training about serious
behavioral problems."4 Finally, the reports recommend "wraparound
services" for the ten percent of students who continue to demonstrate
severe and frequent emotional or behavioral problems." 5 These wrap-
around services involve cooperation between the student, the family;
community agencies, mental health professionals, and the schoo1.316
Until these changes take place, AEPs will not achieve their mis-
sion.817 Instead, AEPs will continue to infringe on fundamental rights
because they are not narrowly tailored to advance their goals." 8 If the
states do not tailor their AEP programs and transfer policies to advance
their goals of discipline, rehabilitation, and education, then the judici-
ary will need to protect the educational rights of America's parents and
their children." 9
CONCLUSION
Transfers of students to Alternative Education Programs ("AEPs")
implicate two fundamental rights. The first, parents' right to make
choices about their child's educatiOn, is well-established. The second,
students' right to receive a minimally adequate education, remains
unrecognized by the U.S. Supreme Court but should be recognized
given its history, tradition of receiving governmental protection, and
implicit role in "ordered liberty." After all, the universal provision of a
basic education has received protection under U.S. law since the
country's inception. Additionally, the states and federal government
have accorded it more protection as the right to vote in popular elec-
tions has expanded. This correlation between the expansion of suf-
frage and education draws on the necessary nexus, acknowledged by
(1998), available at h up:// erie.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/con  ten tdelivery/serviet/ERICServ-
let?accno-=ED420121; U.S. DWI- of Enuc., supra note 308, at 7, 9: Ron Prinz, Research-Based
Prevention of School Violence and Youth Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental and Educational Perspec-
tive, in PREVEN'FING SCHOOL VICD.F.NCE 23, 30 (U.S. Dept of Justice 2000), available at WNW.
ncirs.gov/pdffiles1 /n4/180972.ptIE
315 See FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 88-93; see, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., SIIPM note
308, at 31.
314
 FOWLER ET AL., SUPFC1 note 22, at 89.
3 ' 5 Id. at 92; U.S. DEFT OF EOM., supra note 308, at 38.
318 FOWLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 92; U.S. DEPT OF Enuc., supra note 308, at 38.
317 See supra, notes 276-300.
318 See supra, notes 276-300.
319 See supra, notes 304-305.
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both the Framers and the Court, between broad public enfranchise-
ment and an effective universal public education system.
Given the fundamental nature of these two rights, the operation of
AEPs should be subject to strict scrutiny. Most AEPs, however, are not
narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests. The states' in-
terests in education and student safety are compelling enough, but
many AEPs and AEP tactics have a demonstrated track record of im-
peding a student's educational success, endangering students, and pro-
viding no meaningful assistance to teachers struggling to keep order in
their regular education classrooms.
Well-intentioned politicians, superintendents, and principals be-
lieved that AEPs were a solution to many of the challenges schools face
today. Indeed, there are some AEPs that are producing the desired re-
sult, successfully re-engaging "at risk" students in their education.
Without accountability procedures in place, however, parents and stu-
dents cannot know whether their school does or does not provide a
minimally adequate education. Many students have ended up in
schools that do not provide them with the basic tools they need to read,
write, calculate, and contribute to our democracy'. Consequently, AEPs
appear to prevent, rather than enable, their students' advancement in
grade levels and their students' acquisition of diplomas. The states' uni-
lateral substitutions of courses aligned with state standards for classes
without standards infringes on parents' fundamental right to make
long-term educational decisions for their children. Additionally, the
resulting deficiencies in the transferred child's schooling infringes on
that student's right to receive a minimally adequate education.
More narrowly tailored, and therefore effective, discipline poli-
cies and forms of alternative education exist. In the states that choose
to ignore these models of education and behavior intervention, the
judiciary should ensure that the rights of our parents and students are
not unnecessarily trampled in the quest to create the perfect school.
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